Observations and Lessons learned from Shield and Arrow operation for Israelis and Palestinians
Quietly, Hamas introduced its Home Front command. It trialled to deliver factual information for Palestinians during the escalation to combat mis/disinformation.
For Israel
- Killing leaders changes nothing. It just disrupts militant groups’ operations for some hours. They have built a dynamic organisational structure able to adjust to such losses. There were as well offshore command and control centres in Damascus and Beirut to enable them to manage the war remotely.
- The time between rounds is getting shorter. This was the second round of escalation this year. The first war against Gaza was in 2008, then 2012, 2014, 2021, 2022, 2023. We may even get another round of escalation soon. Hence, Israeli deterrence has strategically deteriorated and has not recovered as Israel hoped. It seems we are getting closer to a wider and prolonged multi-front war instead.
- Israel attempted to devoid the unity of fronts claims by showing lack of unity among Palestinian factions and attacking in the West Bank and Gaza together. Israel has failed in getting such an outcome. Instead, the escalation could have expanded.
- Israel, like Iran axis, developed its own version of the unity of fronts. This operation highlighted some success, but it remains to be seen whether in an actual wide conflict it will show the operational resilience needed to operate for months across multiple fronts.
- Israelis showed that despite internal political feud, society remains united against Palestinians. Nonetheless, this war illustrated how Israeli internal politics is hindering the military, a trend which is likely to continue.
- Neither the Iron dome nor David Sling will be effective and economic options in a prolonged war scenario. Saturation and other strategies proved the limited defensive scope of both systems. This round will almost certainly impact the sales of these systems regionally and internationally. Abraham Accords countries will likely revise any plans to acquire either system.
- Israel launched a war against a group. This is a significant devolution in Israel's military objectives. If it was not for Hamas, PIJ would have carried on for months. Israeli deterrence is disappearing in the Palestinian arena.
- Israel claims of military supremacy are harder to sustain. Its rivals are building capabilities with the aid of Russia and China to undermine its edge and surpass it.
- Still, Israel will likely carry on its operations in the West Bank against militant factions.
For Palestinians,
- Hamas succeeded in uniting Palestinian militant factions under the umbrella of the Joint Room. There was a division of labour among them during the round of escalation. This new unified command and control infrastructure is the first of its kind in Palestinian history.
- Palestinians have effectively sidelined Israel's crown defence system, the Iron dome through adopting electronic warfare and certain launching strategies.
- New capabilities were deployed during this round including new kinds of missiles (bigger and/or more accurate) and electronic warfare capabilities.
- The Resistance Axis was inching closer to escalate the conflict and involve other fronts, which would have challenged Israel’s resilience further.
- Despite Israeli claim, all the missiles used were locally made, albeit with Iran and Hezbollah help. Technology transfer has expanded significant over the past five years.
- Fateh supported Israel's war on PIJ because it was worried about the growing popularity of Hamas in the West Bank and how unity of action can threaten its authority survival. It effectively celebrated the presumed division between PIJ and other factions.
- Quietly, Hamas introduced its Home Front command. It trialled to deliver factual information for Palestinians during the escalation to combat mis/disinformation. The new command is a result of a lesson learned from previous wars.
- Hamas offered government employees vouchers to buy grocery using its banks. Instead of using cash, which was problematic and targeted by Israel, Hamas digitised aid and financialised it. Banks rather than charities and individuals were handling aid. This is a new level of coordinated action by Hamas. Nonetheless, this makes its banking system a prospective target for Israeli cyber espionage.