Gaza’s New Security Architecture Signals a Regional Political Economy Built on Fragile Guarantees
A US-led Gaza resolution creates a fragile security architecture built on external supervision and a stabilisation force with little Palestinian consent.
The United States drafted Security Council resolution on Gaza adoption marks an inflection point in the region’s political economy. External supervision through a Board of Peace. A stabilisation force drawn from willing Arab and Muslim states. Washington is using the Gaza post war framework to consolidate the coalition that underpins the Abraham Accords and to hardwire Arab and Muslim capitals into a long-term security architecture centred on American primacy and Israeli embeddedness in their supply chain. The aim is to provide a controlled pathway out of the war that does not reverse the normalisation agenda despite the scale of Palestinian devastation. The resolution passed with thirteen votes in favour. Russia and China abstained. It endorses President Trump’s twenty-point plan. This includes the ceasefire and covers reconstruction. The Board of Peace would oversee these efforts. Trump himself would chair it. An International Stabilisation Force would deploy. Its mandate runs until December 2027. The force would demilitarise Gaza. It would secure borders. It would train Palestinian police.
A Fractured Palestinian Front
The difficulty is that the plan lacks Palestinian legitimacy. Hamas rejects it outright. Most Gaza based factions refuse disarmament without guarantees that the resolution does not provide. The only Palestinian actor that accepts the plan is the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah which has minimal domestic credibility and no coercive capacity in Gaza. The resolution therefore rests on a political vacuum. It constructs a governance design without a governing subject and assumes that external management can substitute for internal legitimacy. This is a familiar pattern in the region’s political economy where international actors use institutional blueprints to manage conflict environments without altering the conditions that produced them. Senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan stated that Palestinians do not require guardianship or external administration. They are fully capable of governing themselves. The group insists Gaza’s future must come through Palestinian dialogue. Not dictation by the UN or foreign powers. Mousa Abu Marzouk added that the force would become an occupation substitute for the Israeli military, suggesting any foreign troops deployment will be faced with resistance.
The political economy of this approach is revealing. The stabilisation force is meant to convert regional alignment into practical burden sharing. It asks Arab and Muslim states to contribute troops to a theatre where casualties are likely and where the mandate will be contested on the ground. Forces will be expected to operate between Israeli security demands and Palestinian resistance movements that see the mission as an extension of occupation. Few states are willing to absorb fatalities for a mission that lacks local consent. Those who do will negotiate strict caveats that limit their exposure. This creates an incentive structure in which the mission becomes more symbolic than coercive and where the gap between stated authority and practical capacity widens over time. The United Arab Emirates has stepped back. It demands a clear framework before committing troops. Egypt and Turkey voice alarm over demilitarising Palestinian resistance. Cairo insists on negotiated handover. Not forced disarmament. Ankara wants limits to border control. Not occupation policing. Indonesia and Pakistan, however, have expressed willingness to deploy troops to the besieged strip under the UN umbrella. If they deploy troops, this will internationalise the war rather than bring stability to a fragile situation.
Disarmament is the centrepiece but also the most unrealistic component. Hamas and other factions have no incentive to surrender their weapons without political guarantees that Israel will not reoccupy the strip or bypass Palestinian representation altogether. The resolution offers neither. Disarmament therefore becomes a technical objective without a political settlement attached to it. Any attempt to enforce it will place the stabilisation force in direct confrontation with local groups. That is the scenario regional states fear most. It is also the scenario that would unravel the coalition the United States aims to consolidate. The plan links Gaza’s reconstruction and reforms in the Palestinian Authority to a conditional path toward self-determination and statehood. Yet Hamas objects over international guardianship. The vague sequencing of disarmament raises questions about feasibility. The success of the resolution will depend entirely on practical implementation.
Israel’s New Obligations
Israel faces its own set of burdens under this arrangement. For the first time in the post war debate the resolution places responsibility on Israel to allow humanitarian access to Gaza and to refrain from unilateral military operations that undermine the transition. This shifts part of the political cost onto Israel’s security establishment which must now balance domestic expectations of deterrence with international demands for restraint. Israel is also expected to engage with the Board of Peace which introduces an external oversight mechanism into an arena Israel has historically controlled through force. The arrangement therefore imposes constraints on Israel even as it shields it from full responsibility for reconstruction. The force would work with Israel and Egypt to secure borders. It would stabilise the security environment. Israel vetoed Turkish involvement. It refuses international troops in its controlled areas.
The Political Economy of the New Abraham Alliance
The broader regional implications are clear. The United States is attempting to re anchor Middle Eastern order through managed stabilisation rather than negotiated political settlement. The architecture relies on Arab and Muslims participation without Palestinian legitimacy. It relies on Israeli compliance without meaningful leverage. It relies on international oversight without credible enforcement. This is an attempt to govern Gaza through an externally constructed political economy where money security and institutional presence substitute for sovereignty. Furthermore, now Asia stands central to the Abraham Accords. The Asia Middle East Africa (AMEA) region now replaces the traditional MENA focus. More Asian countries are expected to join the Abraham allinace. This expansion binds Israel’s survival and power into supply chains across the region and beyond. Trump embeds these ties to ensure economic interdependence. It rewards normalisation with reconstruction funds from Gulf partners and US investments. Such moves hardwire Arab and Asian capital into Gaza’s future by reducing risks through United States security guarantees.
Russia and China’s position remains unclear. Both abstained from the vote. Their non-participation signals caution. Moscow and Beijing watch the fragile guarantees. They assess if the plan perpetuates conflict management. Or if it opens doors for their influence. The political economy of Gaza’s future now sits at the intersection of American strategy, Israeli insecurity and Palestinian fragmentation. Nonetheless, Hamas rearmament is already undergoing and the reality in the ground is foreign troops will likely be unwelcomed by locals.
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The framing of Gaza's stabilisation through externl management rather than Palestinian agency really exposes the core contradiction here. When you strip disarmament of any political guarantees, you're essentially asking factions to surrender their security without ensuring their sovereignty. The fact that Indonesia and Pakistan are willing to deploy troops while regional powers like UAE and Egypt hesitate tells you everything about burden shring calculus. This feels less like peacebuilding and more like outsourcing occupation through a multilateral framework.